> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.platform.aiplanet.com/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Production checklist

> What to verify before the gateway carries real traffic.

## Infrastructure

* [ ] Public DNS and TLS forward only to the public allowlist proxy.
* [ ] `/ready`, `/metrics`, `/admin/*`, OpenAPI routes, and the console are private.
* [ ] Postgres uses durable storage and tested backups.
* [ ] Redis is private and uses a deployment-specific key prefix.
* [ ] `shared_state.type` is `redis`; production does not enable `allow_process_local_throttling`.
* [ ] Provider, database, Redis, bootstrap-key, administrator-password, and webhook secrets come from a secret manager.
* [ ] Container/image scanning and a pinned image digest are part of deployment.

## Configuration

* [ ] `payload_logging.enabled` is false unless a time-bounded, approved diagnostic session is active.
* [ ] `data_governance.payload_storage` is disabled unless tenant access, PII review, and a bounded `payload_retention_days` policy are approved.
* [ ] `public_base_url` exactly matches the public HTTPS origin.
* [ ] The BYOK custom-endpoint policy is deliberate; `public_https` is paired with tested egress denial of private, link-local, and cloud-metadata destinations.
* [ ] Only validated aliases are public.
* [ ] Every budget-reachable route has reviewed pricing.
* [ ] Model capabilities and unsupported parameters are tested against real providers.
* [ ] Every enabled audio alias passes credential-gated live discovery, typed-pricing, bounded STT/translation/TTS, and synthetic text checks; raw audio remains absent from logs and payload storage.
* [ ] Every enabled realtime alias has one explicit protocol, reviewed `session_second` or TTS character pricing, Redis-backed admission leases, bounded renewable budget slices, strict session/idle/frame/concurrency bounds, a WebSocket-capable public proxy, and provider-backed connect/audio/close/outage/revocation/budget/shutdown/load evidence; ElevenLabs STT input formats are reviewed and raw frames remain absent from logs and payload storage.
* [ ] Request body, input-token, retry, timeout, and cooldown settings match the workload.
* [ ] Bootstrap keys are replaced or tightly controlled after provisioning.
* [ ] `admin_session_cookie_secure` matches the private origin: true for HTTPS, false only for loopback HTTP tunnels.
* [ ] `admin_auth.require_distributed_throttling` is true, password/OIDC initiation limits are reviewed, and Redis is healthy before either authentication entry point is exposed.
* [ ] Every console identity has the least-privilege role; each `org_*` role has exactly one reviewed organization scope and every `system_*` role has none.
* [ ] OIDC uses the exact HTTPS issuer/callback registered at the IdP; immutable subjects, roles, tenant scopes, MFA policy, state replay, and break-glass recovery are exercised.
* [ ] The database is at Alembic head, `admin_audit_ready` is true, and a disposable mutation produces both audit phases without secrets.
* [ ] Every process has a unique stable `LLM_GATEWAY_INSTANCE_ID`; a disposable catalog change reaches current acknowledgements on all live replicas and a forced activation failure degrades the model-catalog component while the last safe runtime keeps serving.
* [ ] Request, audit, and finalized-ledger retention matches contracts; reserved ledger rows survive retention, the worker has a recent successful run, an old/current-row drill passes, and backup expiry plus tenant export/deletion are documented.

## Applications

* [ ] Every application/environment has its own least-privilege key.
* [ ] Every non-bootstrap key has a reviewed `org_id`; rotation overlap is bounded and an old-token expiry/revocation drill passes.
* [ ] RPM, TPM, budget, and expiry are set where required.
* [ ] Applications set output token limits and retain request IDs.
* [ ] Streaming and error paths are tested.
* [ ] Direct-provider rollback variables are retained for the initial observation period.

## Operations

* [ ] `/ready` and Prometheus alerts are connected to incident routing.
* [ ] Request-log drops alert immediately.
* [ ] `admin_audit` readiness failures and `admin_audit_persist_failed` events route to operators; audit retention/export is documented.
* [ ] Budget-alert delivery is exercised with a disposable low-budget key.
* [ ] Postgres restore, Redis outage, provider fallback, stream disconnect, and rollback drills pass.
* [ ] Representative load establishes capacity and latency thresholds.
* [ ] Upgrade and rollback owner, window, and previous image/config are recorded.

Do not infer production readiness solely from a healthy `/health` response.